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KOEHNE 
' DIST URBANCE IN D COMPOUND' : T H E Q UESTION OF CONT RO L IN 
A USTRALI AN I NTERN MENT CAMPS D URI NG W O RLD W AR II • 
s .P. K OEH NE 
On 29 Septem ber 1941, a riot broke out in Internment Camp 3 Tatura. In 
order to cjuell it, Australian soldiers fired three shots into the air. 1 The 
effect was instantaneous, with men and women running from the shots.2 In 
the subsequent Australian Anny investiga tion, the riOt was consistently 
referred to as a 'disturbance', but it was somcwhat more than that.3 As 
intcmees themselves no ted, it involvcd pcoplc fighting each other with 
brooms, spades, pieces o f wood, and stones.4 In histories of internment tllis 
incident has received li tde attention.5 1£ is worth examining in itself, as it 
• From the outset, it must be noted that I am building on Paul Sanrop's previous excellent u'ork on the 
riot in D Compound: Paul Santop, 'l ncompatible with Security: Enemy ~\lien Imemecs from Singapore in 
Australia, 1940-45', l1x j01111l1l1 of IIx Allslmlillll j fll/ish I-lisloricill Sodt(J 12 (1993): 149-169. SarU'Op describes 
the Cl'e", in detail (159-162), and relics on thc Australian Annr reports contained in file 36/ 10 1/ 43, series 
,,11'70/ 1, National Arehil'es o f Australia (hereaft er NAt\), 1\Ie\bourne. " lost of the references J use from 
this record also appear in SanTop. I am expanding on his research by using pre,'iously unexamined 
materials thaI include reports from the internees themseh'es on the riot, contained in NAA file 
255/7 t .')j?92, ~eries ~ 11)508/ 1 , Melbourne. ' lluoughouT, references witt be cited as: NAA [Filc#-Series#]. 
I The shors were fired by Private Sharpe and Caplain Sh:lrpe. C~prain Sharpe fir~d one shot TO slOP three 
m~n who w~re attacking ~noTher internee, and Pri l'llT~ Sharpe fired two shots to StOP an imernee climbing 
a dividing fence between compounds: Reports, Disturbance 'D' Compound, "lajor J. Spro~t, 29 September 
19·H , No. 3 Camp Disturbances, 14 OCtober 1941; Disorders aT No. 3 Camp, 18 OCTober 194 1, NAA 
36/ 101/ 4S-..-;'.1P70/ I, l\lelboume. Sproar's initial repor! SlaTed that the sentry had fired the rtrsT ShOT, and 
the Captain the laner TWO, bUT latet reports indicaT~ ThaT iT was Ihe other way around. 
2 Leffer, Reginato, D Compound lead~r (IIali:lI1s) , 10 Official VisiTOrs, 4 October 1941, N_-\A 
255/71 S/292-.\IP508/ 1, Melbourne. 
J See panicularly Report, DiSTurbance '0' Compound, ~ I ajo[ J. SproaT, 29 5cpTember 1941; and 
Confidential Report, Disturbance in '0 ' Compound (No.3 Camp), Lieutenant-COlonel \V.T. Tackaberrr, 
29 September 1941, NAA 36/ I 01 / 45--,,11'70/ 1, t>.lclbourne. ThroughouT this p~per, I will use the terms 
':\ustralian .-\nn)~ and 'army' inTe rchang~ablr. 
4 Lett~rs, R. Koch, D Compound leader Clews) , TO Official VisiTOrs, 3 October 1941; Reginato, D 
Compound leader (J talians), TO Official VisiTOrs, 4 OCTober 1941; Official VisiTOrs' Report, 7 October 1941 , 
tn NA.A 255/ 715/ 292-;\11>508/ 1, Melboume. 
~ ' Ine only major examination has been Bartrop, 'Enemy Alien Internees', though the incidenT is also 
recorded in Paul Sauer, The I-Iob' Ullld Cnlld: Tbt 5100' of Ilx Trmplt Sodr!)", ttanS. Gunhild Henler 
~Ielboume: Temple SocieTY AUSTralia, 1991), 240. For more general histories of intemment in AustraJia 
during World \'i?ar II, see MargareT Bev~ge, 8thind Billind II' i11': Inlfmnltnl in ANslmlil1 during IFond 11711r II (St 
Lucia: Uni\'~rsity of Queensland Pr~ss, t 993); Johann Weiss, II II'lIsn'l rmlfy IltctJsa!)': Inlimmml in ANslmlill 
wilb t/JlpbtlJis 011 Ibt Stt"OlId W'ond lI"flr (South Australia: J .P. Weis~, 2003); Kay Saunders and Roger Daniels, 
eds, Alim justict: IF/IItil!lt IlIlmll!ltlll ;'1 AlIslm/ill lind NOlt/; Amuim (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 
2000); and Joyce II ~mmond, WIIIIi of Wilf: Taluftl, f{)IJ"wottb. M'/n'/Jisr)11 (ViCToria, t\UStralia: J. Hammond, 
1990). How~\'er, mOST hiSTories of this pcriod focus on a p:lrticubr group ofinl"ernees. Sec, for example: 
Barbara \,(linTer, Sf{lII{~ AI/slmlill: GmJl(III PriSOllrrt of 1V'llr ill AlIslmlill (NSW: Angus & Robertson, 1986); 
l3enzion Parkin, "[be DllllrIll I lIlfmm (Stantnor~, NSW': Cassell Australia, 1979); Paullhrtrop and Gabriell~ 
Eisen, eds, TIx Dltlltm Affilir. A DOffllllfnfll!)' Ruollm' Book ("Iclboume: Schwarl".f. and \"(ljlkinson, The Jewish 
Museum in Australia, 1990); Christine \"(Iinler, 'The long arm o f the Third Reich: inTernment of New 
Guinea Gennans in Tatuta', j Ollmll1 of Poaff HiJlory 38, no. 1 Oune 2003): 85-108; Paul BarU'Op, 
' Incompatible u>lth Sccuril)~ Enemy Alien Int~me~s from Singapore in Australia, 1940-45', TIx jOlll7l1l1 of IIx 
AlIslmlian jlll'ish H islon"mISodt(J 12 (1993): 149-169; Yuriko Nagala, VIIII'lI/lltd Alims: jllJ'flllt!t Inlmlnlml in 
AIIJlmlia (St. Lucia, Queensland: Uni,'ersif)' of Qu~ensland Press, 1996); David Paeeh, PlfJtculioll, D lltlilion 
mId Itlltmmtlll of UllbtftlllS (in SOlllh AltSlftlliil) ill Two I/Yond I/YII"': II dllrk S~I ill Allilmlio 's Cmllll)' of F tdtmlioll 
(Australia: D.Paech, 2001); Konrad Kwiet, "' l3e patien( and reasonable!": The internment of Gennan-
J ewish refugees in Austr ali~', AII!lmlillll jOllnlil1 of Polilifs IlIId Hislory 31, no. I (1985): 61-77; K.G. Loewald, 
'A Dunera Inrernee aT Hay, 1940-41 " l-iisl()ri(a/ S/lidin 17, no. 69 (October 1977): 512-521; K:ly Saunders, , 
"Disco,,~ring" rhe Subversive and Th~ SabOTeur: The disjuncture bet\\'een offici:ll records of internment 
policy and pracric~ and the remembered ~xp~rienc~s of internees in AUSTralia in the Second World \Var', 
Oml H islDlY A ssocialion of AIIJlmlia jOllmol 13 (1991): I- I I. 
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contributes [Q our understanding of wartime in ternment in Australia, but the 
riot also gives further weight to a historiographical argument established by 
Paul Sauer and Christine \'Vinter, as to how the Australian /\nny acted in 
controlling internees during \'Vorld \Xlar 11 . As Sauer succinctly put it~ with 
regards to Camp 3 Tatura: 'At times, the Australian Camp Command hardly 
rook any no tice of the National Socialist activities engaged in by the 
intemees, but insisted that such activities sho uld no t disnl[b law and order'.6 
This has been argued in greater depth by \'Vintet , who sees in such 
behaviour o n the part of the military a 'live and let live' system of operation, 
whereby so long as 'everything was under control', camp rules would not be 
strictly enforced.7 Hence, part of the argument o f this paper is that the 
j\usttalian ALmy's response demon strates that Camp Command's main 
concern was to keep contro l in the camp - witho ut any regard for th e 
internees' differing political views. 8 "rhe riot demonstrates that tlus policy 
did not always work. 
Both \'Vinter and Sauer have focused to a large extent o n the 
operational level of intenlmeo t - dlat is, on the decisions made by the 
officers directly responsible for the camps, and tlleir views of how the 
camps sho uld be nll1 . However, in the wider history of military 
o rganisation , a discrepancy often exists between the operatio nal and 
strategic levels for aml)' operations. 9 Indeed, as complex organisations, 
annies o ften contain divergent views, whilst simultaneously operating on tile 
assumption that there is a clear and unified vision throughout the chain of 
command. PoUowing the riot in Camp 3, the .Australjan J\lJny established a 
Board of Inquiry [Q examine tlle inciden t, and it is the argument o f this 
study that tlle review indkates tlla t a disjunctio n existed between Anny 
po licy and its applicatio n; specificaUy, that camp rules were nOt being 
applied as they sho uld. T hus. an analysis o f this 'Disn lrbance in 0 
Compound' helps to extend existing lustOriographical argument by 
providing further insight into the complexity of Army views 0 0 in ternment 
during World War 11. 
6 Sauer, HolY ullld, 243-244. Throughout, [ intend 'Camp Command' to refer to the Australian .-\nny 
officers at the opcrat ional1evel. 
7 Christine \Vimer, 'New Guinea Germans', 99. [n this instance, \Vintcr was discussing Camp 1 Tarura. 
Both Sauer and \'~;rinter have made their arguments based on the intemlittent application o f camp rules, and 
(in \,\:timer's case) on statements from officers in charge of the camps. Thus, Sauer examine5 rhe attempt5 
10 stop the Il itler salute in Camp 3, and the circuitous prohibition of Nazi insignia in the camp, which the 
anny confiscated. returned 10 internees, then anempted to confiscate again: Sauer, HolY ullld, 243-246. 
Similarly, Winter examines the uncertain application of Cl.mp rules, which she argues were only applied 
when necessaf)' ' to re$lore good relationships u>1t hin the eamp' (98): 'New Guinea Gennans'. 97-99. 103. 
8 Their disregard for Ihe tense situation created br interning Jews and Nazis together is indicati, 'e of rhis. 
Christine \Vimer no tes ,hat Camp Command was aware that 'a certain amount of friction' would exist 
from interning Nazis and Jews together. but that this was not taken \'er)" seriously by the military: \,\finler, 
'New Guinea Germans', 89. 
<) I intend the term 'oper:llional' to denote the administr~uion of the internment camps b)' the Australian 
Aml)' officeu directly in charge of the inTernees. As such, the term includes these officers' policies 
regarding the application of rules and regulations. 'll,e term 'strategic' denotes the O"era11 s trategy o f the 
AUSTralian Anny higher command for internment. II includes adminisrrati"e measures, but those decided at 
a higher level in the chain o f command. 
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Camp 3 Tatura 
Camp 3 Tatura was located around twelve kilometres no rth o f Rushworth, 
in the north o f Victoria. The camp was buil t roughly in the shape o f a 
diamo nd, and quartered into compo unds A-D. Avenues ran between these 
compounds, and each was surrounded by a barbed wire fence. T he 
Australian Ann y divided all o f the intcrnment camps roughly by natio nali ty, 
but Camp 3 0 Compound was th e only ' family' compound in the Australian 
system of in temmcnt and, as a result, jcwish, 1talian and Gernlan families 
were in terned there. to rnle majority o f these internees were j ewish, and 
their compo und leader, Seefeld , consistently complained to the O fficial 
Visitors that many o f tll e German s and I talians with whom they were 
imprisoned were Nazis or fascists. I I 'fhe letters noted increasing tensions 
wi thin the compound: '1 am afraid that ... feelings on both sides will nm so 
high that serious consequences may arise for which 1 as the compo und 
leader cannot take further responsibility'. 12 ] n particular, the j ewish 
in ternees would not tolerate any further Nazis o r fascists being in terned 
Witll tl]em, and Seefeld noted that the strain migh t well lead to 'acts of 
actually [sic] vio lence'. 13 T he Official Visitors recommended to the 
Australian AnT} ), that the Nazis and fascists be movcd, but the Army 
countered with the fact that 0 Compo und was tllC only family compound 
available. 14 
In August of 1941, family groups o f German and halian nationals who 
had been living in Palestine and lean were depo rted to A ustralia.ls The 
Army made a decision that all of Camp 3 should be a ' family cam p' .1 6 The 
10 See NA .. -\ .-\5954. 675/ 8. Melbourne. On the di\1sions of camps along national lines. see Inspection of 
Prisoner of War and Internment Camps, 2 October 1942, NAA 36/ IOI/ 346-M P385/7. Barttop srates that 
the camp had been a 'closed community of anti-Nazi Jewish refugees ' befo re 1941 (160). but letters (see n. 
II) indicate that German and Italian internees were interned in D Compound prior to this. 
II For instance, \,\Ialdemar \Veber, listed as a Nazi Part), O,1Jgmppe"ltiter (Group Leader) in Intelligence 
Reports. was imerned in D Compound: Appendix i, Intelligence Report Tamra (hereafter IR"I), 15 
February 1944, NAf\ 37/ 10 1/ 185-:-'I P70/ 1, Melbourne. The Jews in D Compound complained ahout the 
fascists and Nazis, but to no a\":ti l: see Letters. G. See feld. D Compound leader Oews), to Official Visi tors, 
5 November 1940, 17 J une 1941,27 June 194 1, NA .. c\ 255/715/ 292-;\IP508/ I, Melbourne. On the 
Jewish internees in Camp 3, most of whom came from Singapore, see Barnop. 'Enemy Alien Internees.' 
See also Konrad Kwiet, 'Be Patient and Reasonable'. "Inc Official Visitors \\'ere Australian appointed 
representau\'es \\.ho acted llS lln impartial review board. 'Ineir role was to ensure that the camps were 
being run correctly. and that no ahuses occurred. As such, they were allowed to inspect the camps, and to 
hear the complaints of internees. The Official Visi tor for Camp 3 was Justice Gavan Duffy, of rhe 
S~preme Court of Victoria. 
I Letter, G. Seefeld. D CompoW\d leader (Iews), to O fficial Visitors, 5 November 1940, NA.A 
255/7 15/292-i111'508/1, 1\leloo\lr11c. Winter stateS that the camp was subdivided due to conflicts between 
the Templers and the J ewish families. but Camp 3 appcars to have always been subdivided. though initially 
TO separate the 'men's camp' (Compounds :\-C) from the 'family camp' (0 ): sec Wimer, 'New Guinea 
Gemlans', 100. 
13 Leiter, G. Seefeld, 0 CompoW\d leader (Iews), to Official Visitors, 27 June 194\. NAA 255/7 15/ 292-
i11 1'508/ I, ~Ielbourne. ' Ibis is similar to the ' technical and fundamental problems' cited in New Zealand as 
a .reason for not separating Nazis and Je\1.'s: \Vinter, 'New Guinea Gennans', 89. 
I ~ Report, Official Visitors. 3 October 1941, NA .. -\ 255/7 1 5/292-~fP508/ I, i\ felboutTle. 
b ..-\usualia had earlier agreed to accept enemr subjects ftom Greal Britain and the 'Suairs Senlements' for 
internment, and the Jewish internees in 0 Compound had fallen under this agreement: \Var Cabinet 
Agend um 157/ 1940.3 July 1940, NA .. c\ 258/ 1/ 5-A445, Canberrn. A later amendment allowed civilian 
internees from Palestine to be transported to Australia: Supplement 7 \'(/af Cabinet f\ gendum 157/ 1940, 2 
OctObef 1940, NM 258/ 1/ 5-A 445, Canberra. 
16 On reaching eightcen. single mcn had to lea\'e Camp 3 for Camp I Tatum or Camp 14 Lo\'eday, ho rh 
of which were primarily prisoncr o f war camps. This move was vigorousl). pro tested by rhe internees: See 
IRT, 7 October 1942. II October 1942,22 October 1942,5 NO\'embcr 1942, and 10 February 1943,:--IM 
37/ 101 / 185-~ I P70/ I, ~ I elbourne. 
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'single men' previously interned in Compounds A-C were moved to other 
camps, and the families from Palestine and han replaced them. 17 The vast 
majority of these in ternees were Gennan, and a request to amalgamate 
Compounds A-C in to one camp was granted, with free access bcing allowed 
between these compounds during the day. 18 However, cu.riously, the 
Germans and ltalians were no t moved out o f 0 Compound into what 
became known as the 'German Internment Camp' (Compounds A-C).19 
lnstead, 0 was kept separate, locked off from the others.20 
Australian Army Perceptions : T he Operational Level 
\'VhiJc the internment camps were delineated along lines of nationality, the 
Australian Army Camp Command appears to have also viewed the different 
groups as possessing particular characteristics based upon their ' race'. There 
were undeniably such prejudices regarding Italian internees, and illustrations 
of these can be found in reports from Camp 3. For instance, a 1942 
Australian Army report noted: 'Order loving Gennans resent the shiftless 
natures o f the Imlians, who are really a ll"lOngrel mixed breed in many 
cases'.21 ivlo reover, a later report stated that the Germans 'are far more 
reliable in fulftlling their duties than the 1talians', and that the Jewish 
internees were 'unsatisfactory' in this regard.22 There were concerns to 
identify those internees who were 'dangerous' within Camp 3, but for the 
o fficers in charge of the camps the major issue was that of contto1.23 They 
were ordered to guard those interned, and that was what they did.24 The 
fact that ln telligence Reports were regularly issued regarding events in the 
camp indicate that Camp Command was carefully obsetving the internees. 
17 See Joyce (l ammond, W(III.J of IVitt', 10 I. 
18 '111e majority of the internees were members of the Ttnlpt/gtstll.Jeb'lji ( I"emple Society) a German ethno-
religious group that had becn established in Palestine since 1868. ' Ille m:ljor history of the '!'emple Societr 
is Paul Sauer's /' {IJ!)' 1..,1111(1, : ~ hhough a hiSTory of Their involvement IVlrh rhe N:n:i Party AJIJltllldm!fllliJoliofl 
can bc found in Ralf l3alke, H(lkillkr(llZ illl H rili§11 /..,tll/d: dir 1 ..... 'J DAP.l,JllldnglJlppt P(lliis/ifl(1 (Erfurt: Sunon, 
20(1). 'Ille 'open camp' request was made on 13 September: Report. Official Vlsitof5, 16 September 1941 , 
NA."- 255/7 15/304-l\ IP508/ 1, l\ lelbourne. A week later, open access was allowed: Sauer, HoI! /..,tll/d, 239. 
19 A Christmas programme from 1943 referred to the Dm/Jchu IlIlmlitl7lltgJltl§r. Ilclmut Ruff, TmllJpoI1td 10 
Ilx Ellt! of Ilx Ili'ond (l\ lelboume: H.Ruff, 1997),20. Internees later suggested making Compound A an 
Italian Camp, Band C the 'Gennan Camp' and D a Je,\~sh camp: Declaration to Official Visitors, 7 
OClober 1 9~1. NAf\ 255/715/ 304-:\IP508/ I, l\ ldbourne. A home-nude map of Camp 3 is included with 
this declaraTion. It seems thaI inTerneeS onl}' began TO be mOI'ed after the no t in Camp 3, and twenty,sCH:n 
' local Gcnnans' had mOI'ed into the 'Gennan Camp' by 13 NO" cmber 19~1 : Letter, Albrecht Aberle to 
Swiss Consul, 13 NOI'ember 1941 , Temple SocieTY A usrralia Archi,'cs (hereafTer TSAA), ,\lclboume. There 
u'ere some 'mi)l:ed Jcwish' families in the Gennan Camp, such as the Auer o r DUcker families, where one 
~rtner in a couple was Je\\~sh . Mr thanks to Helmut Glenk for this infonnation. 
- On The separMion of D Compound, see InspecTion o f Prisoner-of-\"'ar and Internment Camps, ? 
OClober 1942, NAA 36/ 10 1 / 346-:\IP385/7. l\lelbourne. EI'en when O\'Cfcrowding became a problem in 
Camp 3 1\ -C, Compound D was kcpt separate: Letter, Samueil io ffmann to Swiss Consul, 26 NOI'ember 
~9.J2, TSAA, l\Ie1bounle. 
_I Australian l\nn)' comment, IRT, 7 OCTober 1942, NAA 37/ 101/ 185-il W70/ I,l\ lelbourne. 
22 IRT,9 December 1942, NAA 37/ 101 / 185-;\, 11>70/ 1, l\lelboume. Bo th Kwic! and Bartrop ha\"e argued 
ThaT There were similarly prejudiced "iews of the Jewish internees, see ' Be PaTient and Reasonable' and 
~~jnemr Alien Internees.' 
- \'(Iinter nOtCS that Camp 1 TaTUra was l.jcwed entircly as a camp for 'dangcrous intcrnecs': \X/inter, 'New 
Guinea Gcrmans', 89. Ccn ainly some inrernees were mOI'cd from C:,mp 3 to Camp I TaTUra, although 
this tcndcd to be because thc), were single men, and Camp I w~s II 'men's camp.' IT was also due 10 
overcrowding in C:unp 3 Compounds .-\-C, see Lefler, Swiss Consul to Gottlieb Ruff, 3l\Jay 194.'), TSAA, 
"- Ielboume. 
24 'Illeir :'Ulhorit)' to do so was e5tablished undes Ihe pro" jsions of the National Security Ac! 1939, which 
pro\.jdcd for thc intcrnment o f civilian internees and prisoners of w:lr in internment camps. 
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However, such observation remained essentially passive, and breaches of the 
camp rules did no t necessarily result in any fonn of disciplinary measures, If 
the in ternees remained orderly, they were left to their own devices as to how 
the camp was run. 
The 'German Internment Camp' 
At the operarionallevel the Anny's lack o f interest in the internees, except in 
so far as they remained controlled, can be seen in the 'Gennan lnternment 
Camp', It is a setcled point that this camp was ' run along National Socialist 
lines'.25 The most public expression of cllis was clle Hitler Youth group 
established in the camp, which organized morning sport ifriibspor~, evening 
lectures, and solstice celebrations. 26 'l'hese activities were cause for 
comment by the Jewish internees. As Dr Koch (a Jewish compound leader) 
noted in a letter, Compounds A-C had: 
800 Nazis and Fascists from Pales tine who in compliance with 
their usual habit immediately after their arrival started with so-
called phys ical exercises, such exercises however being only [00 
well-known to us as clle usual marching of l-Litler-formations.27 
rvIoreover, as Compounds A-C were opened up, he wrotc that Jewish 
intemees consrancly saw clle G ermans 'exchanging tile N azi-salu te'.28 111is 
was also no ted by \'Verner Heimann , who accused tile Camp Command of 
being biased, 'prohibiting us Oewish internees-I tile use o f the sign CV' for 
Victory' without ' taking any steps to prevcnt Nazis o r Fascists o f expressing 
tlleir feeling by singing cllCir songs and using their salutcs'.29 The Australian 
Army compiled intelligence repo rts that noted public displays by d,e Hider 
Youth, bur mey did nOt attempt to stop any such activitics.30 Indeed, 
occasions like dle winter solstice had [0 be approved by Camp Command , 
25 As the leaders in the German Camp had put it: Letter, 6 Junc 1943, Samuel Hoffmann and Emil 
\\?ildennuth (for the camp adm.inistration) to Hans i'ec11er, Internee in 0 Compound, in Hoffman [sic], 
Samuel, NA.A :\367, Canberra. See also Sauer, J-/11!J ulIIIl, 243-45; Winter, 'New Guinea Germans', 99-101; 
S. P. Koehne, 'Refusing to Lea\'e: Perceptions of Gennan National ldemiq· during Internment in Ausu alia, 
1941 -1945', in IFar tllld Cilit!"Jhip, eds J. Beaumont and I. O' Bricn (Canberra: National Muscum of 
Australia, fo rthcoming). Fornler intcrnccs Griffin and Fugmann ha\-c also wrincn on this point in thcir 
mcmoirs: Helga Griffin, 'From Intcrnmcnt 10 lntcgration: .-\ testamcnt of hope', illrkpmdml JcholnfT 
A JI(xialioll of AIIJlmli(l IV/lit ,., 2, no . 3 (2002): 20-22; Wilhehn Fugmann, UISJ ddll 8wI iibm 1I7(1JJU fohrrtl: 
Chwllik tiwr wIII/duv(lrtll Rtist ( rreuchtlingen: \,\laher £, Keller, 1996), 86ff. I I must be no ted thai this does 
9gt mean Ihat all internees were Nazis. 
- Interview with former internee, II Junc, 2003. See also Sauer, Hob' ullld, 244 ff; Win tcr, 'Ncw Guinea 
Germans', 100-101. '1l1ere was also a I3dr..[ or HlIm/ dm/JC/)(r M tidd (Leaguc of Gcnnan Girls) cstablished in 
,~mp. 
- Letter, R. Koch, D Compound leader Oews), to Official Visitors, 3 October 1941, in N.A.A 
255/7 15/ 292-"' 1'508/ 1, ~ Iclbourne. Other reports recorded the Hider Youth marching in formation: 
lRT, 26 D«ember 1942,3 (klober 1943. NA:\ 37/101/ 185-:-' IP 70/ 1, Melbourne. A former internee 
also rcmembered thc Ihrill of marching on 'Gcnnan national holidays' to ' thc ro using rh}'thm of a bris k 
march': Morna Korrschak, ' Music in thc internmcnt camp Tatura: 1941 -46', 'frmpltr &ami 591 (Dcccmbcr 
l~91), 5. 
- Letter, R. Koch, D Compound leader Oews), to Official VisitOrs, 3 October 1941, in NA.A 
255/7 15/ 292-ilI P508/ t. Saucr notes that the Nazi salute was nOt completel}' banned in Camp 3 until 
~Wri1 1944: /-10& /..ill/d, 245. 
- ' Letter, W. Heimann to Official Visi tors, 29 September 1941; N:\: \ 255/7 15/292-il IP508/ 1, 
il ld hourne. 
30 IRT, 26 December 1942,3 Octobcr 1943, NAA 37! IOI/ 18S-il IP 70/ 1, ~lclbourne. BOfh reports norc 
the usc of the "'1 leill liller" salute.' 
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as it involved the Hitler Youth marching in procession Witll burning torches 
to a central bon fIre.3 1 1 t was just such a public event tllat sparked off tile 
. 
not. 
As remembered by a fo rmer internee, tile siruation was tllis: 
\'Vell, there werc jews in there [D Compo undJ, togetllcr with 
some Gennans, and, ah, some of our young fe llas, tlley started to 
march up and down tile compound, and of course, when they 
passed tile compound the jews were in, they started to sing some 
Nazi songs, and tllcn tile Jews started to shout across at tllcm, 
have a go at tllem, of course, and tllen o nc o f tile Germans in thc 
o Compound, he then, hc said 'Good on you, boys! Keep it 
up! '32 
T he army records indicate that tlus is corrcct, and that \'Valdcmar 
\'Veber was the internee in 0 Compo und who callcd 'across the lanc to the 
singers in C Compound, "BRAVO, BRAVO", raising his hand in thc Nazi 
salute, and calling " Heil Hitler"'.33 As a result of demonstratio ns by the 
j ewish internees against both the singers and \'Veber, all internees were 
ordered to their huts. r\ s reco rded by M,ajor Sproat, the Camp 
Commandant, tlle jews went in 'slowly and very grudgingly', while tllose in 
C did so 'very willingly and effectively'.34 The next day the incident was 
investigated by Major Sproat and his Commanding Officer, Lieurenant-
Colonel Tackabcrry, both from 1 Th Garrison Battalio n (in charge of the 
camp). The two men received assurances from Gottlieb Ruff, the German 
Camp leader, 'who ... offered his co-operation in maintaining o rder and 
promised that he would t.'lke steps to prevent the young people singing Nazi 
songs ncar the Jewish compo und'.35 lnteresringly, as the reports piled up in 
the Army investigation no furthcr rcfcrence was made to the fact tha t Ruff 
here agreed that the songs were 'Nazi songs'. 
O n visiting 0 Compound, Sproa t records that \'Veber frecly admitted 
his actions, justifying them by saying that ' the jews had called the singers 
"Nazi Swine .... 36 Yct, no actio n was taken against \'Valdemar \'Veber and 
instead Tackaberry o rdered a jcwish internee, Tilly Heimann, be placed in 
thc cells, as she was part of a largc crowd in D Compound, ' talking loudly, 
waving her anns and pointing to j"\'Valdemarts wifel lvfrs \'Veber, obviously 
using insulting terms towards her'.37 Although Sproat wrote as though he 
and Tackaberty witnessed this occurrence, other reports from internees all 
31 A remembrance of o ne of these solstice celebrations can be found in Ileimut Ruff, 'Christmas 50 Years 
~'f0" Ttlllpltr Rtrom 547 (December \993, January 1994): 5 
Interview with former internee, 3 June 2003. 
33 Report, Disturbance 'D' Compound, I\ lajar J . Sproat, 29 Sep tember 1941 , NAA 36/ 101/ 45-I\IP70/ 1, 
Mdbo unle. 111is incidelll is also recorded in 13artrop. 160-162. allhough at the lime Ihrtrop was writing 
\X'ebc: r's name had been CJ,:cisc:d from the reco rds. 
34 Report, Disturbance 'D' Compound, Major J. Sproat, 29 September 1941, NA."- 36/ 101/ 45-1\/ 1'70/ 1, 
~lelbourne. 
) Ibid. Gottlieb Ruff was the overall leader for Compounds A-C: IRT, 24 February 1945, in Il aslinger, 
P.). , NAA 1\367. Series A367 is a series o f intelligence dossiers, accessible by mune. 





agree that he imprisoned Tilly Heimann solely on tvlrs \'Veber's word.38 An 
hour later a rio t broke out in 0 Compound.39 Three o f the Jewish internees 
anacked \'Veber, and a young man from C Compound sta rred climbing the 
fence to get into 0 Compound.40 This was when the guards fired three 
warning shots, to stop the rio t and thc attack on \'Vebcr, and to dissuade the 
man climbing the fence. In the end, Tilly Heimann was released from the 
Camp 3 prison, and \'Veber was moved to Camp 1 Tatuta.41 
Camp Command and the Board of Inquiry 
Thc languagc used by Major Sproat and the actions hc took indicatc that 
what he demanded from the internees was the maintenance of o rder. 
Outside o f this conce,m, he did no t seem to care about th e cause o f the 
incident. His supeLio r o fficer agreed. Lieutenant-Colonel Tackaberry's 
report deserves Cluotation in full , as it clearly demonstrates the negative 
attitude towards ' trouble makers': 
The compound concerned [DJ has given a great deal o f trouble 
during a period o f several months, and thc Jews therein arc 
continually asking for the removal o f the Nazis and fa scists who 
arc intemcd with them. ] am o f the opinion that dle disturbance 
of last night and today was a planned demonstration in order to 
advance their case for the removal o f the Nazis and Fascists. 
None of the Jews, including the compound leader, evinced any 
desire to help the Camp Commandant to restore order. O n the 
o rner hand, the Imemecs in the o ther Compounds dispersed 
quickly whcn ordcred to do so, and dle compound Lcaders were 
very helpful. From my enquiry, 1 am o f the opinion that the 
people in 'C' Compound singing the German songs wcre doing so 
merely in relaxation and nOt with any intent to 'bait' the JcwS. 42 
.r\ milita ry Boa rd of Inquiry was convened to examine dle Liot in the 
camp, and, more specifically, to review the actions taken by the camp 
officers and guards in dealing with the incident. In contrast to Tackaber,ry 
and Sproat, this Board seems to have accepted the poim that 'whether the 
singing in 'C' Compound was motivated by levity o r no t, it was the primary 
38 Letters, w. Weber 10 Swiss Consul, 2 OClOber 194 1; R. Koch, 0 Compound leader Oews), 10 Official 
Visitors, 3 OClober 1941; and Reginato, 0 Compound le~der (1 tali~n s), to Official Visitors, 4 OClOber 
194 1; NAA 255/7 1 5/292-~l p508/ I, ~Iclbourne. 
39 Report, Disturbance '0 ' Compound, }.Iajor J. Sproat, 29 September 1941 , NAA 36/ 10 1/ 45-'\ '1'70/ 1, 
'\ 'elboume. 
40 Ibid. 
'II Ibid. There is some question as to how long Ileimann \vas imprisoned. Sproat states it \vas an hour, 
but mOSt internees stated that it \I.'as fon r -eigh t hours: Letters, W. Ileimann to Official Visi tors, 29 
September 1941; W. \'('eber to Swiss Consul, 2 October 194 1; and R. Koch, 0 Compound leader Oews), to 
O fficial Visitors, 3 OCTober 194 1, NA.'\ 255/715/ 292-}.1P508/ I, Melbourne. \'\'aldem~r did not stay in 
Camp I for long, as a lener indicates he was moved back to Camp 3 (Compound 13) hr November: Leiter, 
Albrecht Aberle to the Swiss Consul, ?6 November 1941, in TS:\."-, ~ Ielbourne. 
42 Con fidential Report, OislUrbance in ' 0 ' Compound (No. 3 Camp), Lieutenant-Colonel W.T. 
'l'ack:lberry, 29 September 1941 , N."- A 36/ 10 I / 45-~1 P70/ I, Melbourne. The Ceneral O ffi cer 
Commanding (Coq disagreed that rhe demonstration was 'planned', but did note that the J ewish 
internees \,·ere disgruntled, and that \X'eber only further aggravated the situation. The COC blamed the 
singers, as rhe starting point for the whole debacle: Confidential Note, G OC, Southern Command, No. 3 
Camp Tatura Oisorders, 2 OCtober 1941, NAA 36/ 10 1/ 45-~ 1 P70/ 1, Melbourne. 
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cause of the resultant bad feelings and displays'.43 In the reports and 
telegrams sent to this teview about the rio t, a remarkable process of 
minimisation occurs, particularly in r'Viajor Sproat's reports, where the event 
changes from the 'young people singing Nazi songs' r.o 'singing Gennan 
songs' to children 'o f 10 years and under in playful mood', who were 
moving 'around the compound ann in ann singing nursery rhymes'.44 There 
arc a number o f possible reasons why this may have occurred. O ne 
explanation is that there was a bias against the Jewish intcmees, such that 
Sproat was \viUing to accept the German Camp leaders' version of events at 
face value. 45 A more likely explanation, though, is thar accepting the 
Getl11an intemees' statement of events was in the best interests of Sproat 
and Tackaberry, particularly as tile actions of Camp Command were the 
major point of investigation . 
The Board o f lnquiry was attempting to find out why a riot had 
occurred in camp, and what Camp Command had or had nOt done to 
prevent it. 1t is probable, then, tha t Sproat was primarily attempting to 
justify the actions taken by himself and his men. If the initial provocation 
could be seen as facile, the measures taken against the Jews in Compound 0 
- as well as the inaction of the Camp Command - might be seen as 
appropriate. This explanation is also the most likely because Sproat's 
reports only took on this tack after the Board had agreed the singing was the 
'primary cause' of the whole debacle. It was much harder fo r a Board of 
Inquiry to decide that action should have been taken against children 
'singing nursery rhymes' than Hitler Youth marching and singing Nazi songs. 
This is particularly the case because the latter situation was specifically 
covered by camp rules. 
The rules in camp sta ted that ' [dJrilling or march.ing in military 
formation shall no t be allowed, fo r any purpose o ther than physical training 
and fatigues and movements from place to place'.46 Even more pertinent to 
the situation in Camp 3 was tllat: 'T he holding of political meetings at which 
any political propaganda is used or Nazi or Fascist principles recommended, 
advanced or urged, is strictly forbidden. 'fhe Nazi and raseist salute will not 
be pennitted '.47 \'Veber had been in direct disobedience of camp rules in 
giving the Nazi salute and shouting 'Heil Hider', and the Board of Inquiry 
re'1uested a reason why no action was mken against him, 'in view of his 
admission regarding his provocative actions in contravention of camp rules 
and having regard to tlle general aonosphere \vithin the Compound'.48 No 
ade'1uate explanation was ever given, though in the end it was decided that 
43 Ibid. 
44 TIle quotes arc from: ~Iajor Sproat, 29 September 1941; Lieutenant-Colonel Tackaberr),. 29 September 
1941; and i\ lajor Sproat. 8 October 1941 and 14 October 194 1, reporting to the Board of Inquiry, NAA 
3f.J/ 1 01/ 45--),[1'70/ 1. MciOOurne. 
4;:, Sproat does SC1!m 10 h:l\'e recei\'ed his info nnation from the Gennan leaders, who later claimed there 
was no marching, lind that the songs \I;ere 'Gennan children's songs' o r 'hamlless folk songs': see 
respectively Reports. Official Visitors, 7 October 1941, N.-\.-\ 255/715/ 292-M I>508/ 1; and GOC, 18 
October 1941 , NA.-\ 36/ 101/ 45-MI>70/ 1, Melbourne. 
46 Paragruph 27, Camp Rules issued by 1 ;\Iarch 1941, NA,\ 255/7 15/ 292-;\[ 1'508/ I, Meloourne. On this 
point, it was later noted in an Intelligence Report that the Il itier Youth acti\~tie s were suspected to be 
'political' in nature, and not religious or sportS-oriented, as apparently had been argued by the German 
internees: IRT, 26 December 1942, N.-\.-\ file 37/ 101 / 185, series ,,[1'70/ 1, Melbourne. On the problems 
with non-application o f camp rules in TaTura 1, sec \,(Iinter, 'New Guinea Germans', 98. 
47 Paragraph 27, 1 a). Camp Rules issued by 1 March 1941, NAA 255/ 715/ 292-,,[ P508/ 1. 
48 Board of Inquiry, 7 OCiober 1941 , N.A...'-\ 36/ 10 I / 45-1\11>70/ 1, Melbourne. 
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\X/eber's return to Camp 1 was sufficien t punishment, 'in view of the fact 
that \'Veber's provocation was caused by the Jews calling lthe singers] "Nazi 
swine"'.49 
The final decision o f the Board o f lnquiry wi th re!,rards to Camp 
Command was that dle soldiers were to be reprimanded fo r firing the sho ts 
and the procedures regarding use o f fi rea rms in Camp 3 sho uld be reviewed, 
but the Commanders were no t reprimanded, despi te the Board 's po inted 
comments regarding their lack of action.50 It was clear, however, that the 
Board believed that Camp 3 sho uld have been run mo re stricdy in 
accordance with the camp rules. \X'hat is even more in teresting is that the 
repo rts o f Sproat and Tackaberry indicate that they toO realised that the 
Camp Command policy o f internee 'self regulatio n' was at variance with 
their supetio rs, as dley adjusted dleir repo rts to fit the perceived views o f 
the Board. Th e extent o f this becomes clearer th rough the in tem ees' own 
records o f the rio t. 
Internees' Perceptions51 
In repo rts and leners to the O fficial Visitor, Justice Gavan Du ffy, the 
inte11lees in D Compound provided their own views on the 'disturbance'. 
\Xlith some agreement, these fall into two sto ties: that o f the German and 
Italian intem ees, and that o f the Jewish intem ees. Internees on bo th sides 
attempted to po rtray the other side in as bad a light as possible, as indicated 
in the ser.ies o f telegrams sent from, respectively, Jewish, German and ltalian 
internees fo llowing the riot: 
O ur personal security gravely endangered anti-Jewish riOts 
shooting b roken o ut inside o ur Compo und - yo ur immedia te 
presence required . 52 
Following violent assault by Jews against my wife and myself 
!vlilimry Autho rity sending me back to Camp 1 today, leaving wife 
here please visit us immediately.53 
[F]ollowing violen t assault by Jews against one o f our section 
Milimly Authorities transferred victim to ano ther camp separa ted 
him from wife please come immediately fo r Investigation.54 
49 Board o f In<jui ry, 14 OCToocr 194 1, N:\.-\ 36/ 101 / 45-,\11'70/ 1. Md bournc. In This, Thc)' acccpTed 
Sproat's reply to their initial <juery, as to what had been done 10 punish \'(Ieber: see 1\ lajor SproaT to the 
Board o f Inquiry, 8 OCtober 1941, NA.-\ 36/ 101/ 45-;\11'70/ 1, Melbourne. This is in spite of the fact that 
the mo\·e appears TO have been made in the firs t instance to prOtect \'(Ieber. \,\Ieber was welcomed inTO 
Camp I br Haslinger. who 'm:,de The declaration as National SocialisT camp leader'. Sec Haslingcr, F.J., 
t-J:\:\ A.367, Canberra. 
~ Board of In<juiry, 14 October 1941, NA.A. 36/ 101/ 45-;\11'70/ 1, Melbourne. 
:> 1 Of interest generally in this field is K:ly Saunders' work. See particularl), "'Discovering" the Subversive 
~nd the SaboTeur.' 
2 Telegram, It Koch, D Compound leader Oews), to Official Visitors, 29 September 1941 , NA." 
36/ 101 / 45-1\11'70/ I. i\ lelbourne. ~3 Telegram, \Y./. \'(leber TO Swiss Consul, 30 SepTcmber 194 1, NAA 36/ 101/ 45-1\ IP70/ I, i\ lclbourne. 
54 ReginaTo, D Compound Icader (1 Talians), to O ffici:,l Visitors, 29 Sep tember 1941 , NAA 36/101/ 45-
t. IP70/ 1, ,\ Ielbourne. 
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]n fact, one o f the j ewish in ternees argued \Xfeber was responsible for the 
singing, having (organised [i t] by sho uting over the fence'.55 The Australian 
Army Camp Command, o n thc o thcr hand, accused the j ewish in ternees o f 
a 'planned demonstratio n'.56 
This A rmy perspectivc was partly bascd on thc earlier letters from 
Seefeld, but it is not clear that anyone in the compo und in tended that a rio t 
break o ut.57 Both sides appear to have been willing to fight, and justice 
Duffy gavc perhaps the most accurate assessmen t: 'whoever gave the first 
provocatio n it was most willingly accepted and ... substantia lly both sides 
are to blamc fo r what happened'.58 The point that Duffy missed o ut was 
the blame that sho uld have been allocated to the Camp Command. 
Ultimately, it was the action of Tackaberry in jailing Tilly Heimann that 
caused the tio t to b reak o ut, by providing a point o f connict in an already 
. . 
ten se sltuanon. 
In their repo rts, the j ewish internees claimed that the initial 
provocatio n came from the singers, and that the songs included lyrics such 
as: 
\Vhcn j cwish blood drips from the knives ... 
Put thc j ews against the wall whilst we arc marching against 
England ... 
Wle march o n until everything fa lls to pieces, tOday we are masters 
o f Ge11l1any, tomo rrow of all the world.59 
As therc were no independent witnesses who could unders tand German, we 
canno t be certain what all thc songs ac tually werefJO The last song, tho ugh, 
was sung by the Gennan youth o n th e transpo rt ship o n the way ro 
Australia. Fatller \Valter Stenner, a CatllOlic priest who was o nc o f the 
internees from Palcs tine, no ted in his dia ry tha t the German youth had sung 
Gennan fo lksongs and Hitler VO Utll songs du.ring tllC jo umcy to Australia, 
including o ne Wi tll tllC lyrics: 
\'Ve shall go o n marching 
Even tho ugh everyth ing shatters and falls 
55 letTer, \'{l. Heimann TO Official VisiTors, 29 SepTember 194 1; N:\:\ 255/7 15/ 292-1\11'508/ I. 
I\lelbourne. 
56 ConfidenTial Report, DiSTurbance in 'D ' Compound (No. 3 Camp), LieUTenant-Colonel \X/.T. 
'J1ckaberry, 29 September 1941, NAA 36/ 101 / 45--,\ IP70/ I,Mclboume. 
:> Letters, C. Seefeld, D Compound leader Oews), to Official VisiTOrs, 5 November 1940, 17 June 1941, 
2~JWle 1941, NAA 255/7 15/ 292-;\IP508/ I, ~ Ielboume. 
: Report, Official VisiTOrS, 7 October 194 1, NAA 255/7 15/ 292-MP508/ 1, Melbourm:. 
;,9 LeTTer, R. Koch, D Compound leader Oev.1s), to Official VisiTors, 3 October 1941. NA.o\ 255/ 715/ 292-
I\IP508/ 1, I\ lelbourne. As nOTed earlier, some ann)' rcports also placed The blamc on thc singers: 
Confidential Note to Board of Inquiry, COC, SOUThern Command, No.3 Camp TaTura Disorders, 2 
October 1941, NA.o\ 36/ 101/ 45--,\11'70/ 1, 1\lelbourne. '111e line 'When Jewish blood drips from the 
knives' is popularly believed to be from the Ilo rst Wessel song. ' Ihe HorST Wessel song had been sung aT 
various celebrations in The Templer communiTies in Palestine (Sauer, HolY i.Jllld, 199,215), hUT the song 
iTself docs nor, in facT, conT:tin These lrrics: on \-Iorsl Wessel, sec Richard J, Evans. Tbt Com/II!, of Ibt TNr" 
~ic", (London: Penguin, 2(04), 266-269 (The song's lyrics :Ire on 268). 
On this pOinl, see Bartrop, 'Enemr Alien Internees', 160. 
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For to d ay it is Germ a n y who h ears u s 
A nd to m o rrow it will be the w h o le wodd ,6 1 
A J ewis h guard o n the s hip complained that th e lyrics were ' today 
Gennany belo n gs to u s, and tomorrow it w ill b c the whole wodd',62 'I11 C 
transla to r of Sten ner's diary, E rhard Gohl, argues th e Gennan word hiirl 
Olears) was misheard as geMr! (belongs to). 63 T he song itself is Hans 
Baumann's 'Es z itte rn die m o rsch e n Knochen ' , w hic h h as the c h o m s: 
\Xlir wcrde n weite r marschicrcn 
Wenll alles in Scherben falit, 
Denn h e u te da h 6 rt un s D e utschland 
U nd m o rgen die !,tanze \Xlelt. 64 
Gohl 's translatio n m a tches this p e rfectly, 
'fhe o thc r son gs, w hic h \X1ebe r n o te d 
wcr e ' popular and marc hing son gs', mig ht 
h ave b een an y o f the Hitler Youth son gs, as it 
seem s likely th ere were Hitle r Youth 
songb ooks in th e camp.65 Indeed , a 1939 
Hitle r Youth son g b ook tllat was u sed in 
researching this pape r appear s to h ave been a 
cop y from Camp 3 Tatura.66 T h e e ditio n is 
n ow s tored in the main library collectio n o f 
th e U niversity o f Melbourne, but a p revio u s 
library stamp - Der ulldesjllgelldfiibrer, Hj, 
IfYilhelllla, Paliis/illa (sec image) - indicates that this cop y belo n ged to tlle 
1-1 itle r Youth in \Xlilhelma, Pales tine . 67 I nte111ees fro m \ X1ilhclma had 
ccrtainly b een able to bring some o f th eir brass in s tnllnents with them into 
Camp 3, and the like lihood is that this son g b ook was b roug ht in to camp 
w ith the m .68 
61 Fadler \~Iaher Stenner, diary entry for P August 1941 , in Erhard Gohl, TIlt Tnlllspol1nfioll of Mfmbm of 
tilt Timplt Sod,!), 10 Allslmlip for IlIlemll/tIIl (NSW, Auslralia: C. II. Gohl Publishers, 1991), 23. The 
translaTIon is Gohl's. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. As shO\m in the German \·erse, it may ha\'e been d(l hiil1 misheard as §IJiirl. 
64 Ibid. Gohl nOtes the song on the ship U'1lS 'Roncn Bones a-shaking', and the first stanza (which he 
~nslatcs) is identical to (he first stanza of Baumann's song. 
;) Letter, W. \'\'eber to Su>iss Consul, 2 October 1941, NAA 255/ 715/ 292-,\11'508/ 1, l\ lelboume. 
66 Reichsjugc:ndlUrung, U,mr U rdfriJllr/x U rdrr drr Hillrr-jugmd (Miinchen: Zenrrakerlag del NSDAP, 
' ~39). 
6 Ihe Hi signifies Hillrljllgmd (Hider Youth). Willleima U'1lS one o f the Temple Society senlements in 
Palestine, established in 1902, and was named both in honour of an 1898 \>isit by Emperor \X'ilhelm II to 
Pales tine, and in honour of King Wilhelm II of Wiirucmbcrg (the home state of the Templers). See TIN 
Tlmplt SfXit(F All O/ltnWw (l\lelboume: Temple Society Australia, 1986), Appcndi...; ii, 1-6; Ttmpltr H andbook 
ID ldboume: Temple Society Australia, 1992), 119-122; Sauer, HoI! u llld, lO(l 
8 In an inten>iew with former internees, 20 Mav 2003, it was mentioned that a bran band was formed in 
camp using instruments brought from W'ilhelma·. Internees had also brought swastika badges and images 
of 1 Iitlcr with them into internment, and onc of the first requests of the German Camp leaders was that 
these be returned: Report, O fficial Visitors, 16 September 1941, NAA 255/ 715/ 304-;\11'508/ 1, 
l\ lclboume. ·n lese items were returne<1 in November 1941: Letter, Swiss Consul to l\lbrecht Aberle, 12 
November 1941, TSAA, Melbourne. According to Sauer, t hi ~ was along with 'books that were ob\riousl)' 
National Socialist li ter:llure': S:luer, HolY LlIId, 244. Songbooks used by the Templer youth group, 
}If§lIIljmppe (established :lfter the war) contain some of the soldicrN' and sai!or~' songs from the Hitler 
Youth songbook: see TSA:\ file A34: 004, }.[dbourne. It is of interest that in 1942 the camp leaders 
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All intel11ees agreed that the Jewish compound leaders re-established 
order by stopping the altercation with \V'eber in 0 Compound, and that 
after a 'lengthy palaver' Sproat agreed to investiga te the following 
m0l11ing.69 These reports directly contradict Tackaberry's assertion that 
'None of the Jews, iNcllfding the COIllPOlflld leader, evinced any desire to help the 
Camp Commandant to restore order'.?o The intel11ees' letters also provide 
more information than the military reports as to what was said in the 
meeting held in 0 Compound between Tackaberry, Sproat, and the 0 
Compound leaders.?l \X/hat comes out of the proceedings is tha t the Camp 
Command supported the Gennans and Italians over the Jews in 0 
Compound, mostly because the Jewish intel11ees were seen as disruptive and 
uncontrolled.72 
Tackaberry and Sproat had the Italian and Jewish compound leaders 
present when they questioned \Veber, and \Veber freely admitted his 
actions.?3 In \Veber's version of events, the 'young people in Compound C 
... marched round their compound singing Gemlan soldiers' songs', and it 
was on their second circuit that the Jewish intemees started shouting at 
them to stop singing, to which \Veber (in D Compound) retaliated, and 
ended by shouting 'Heil HitIer'. 74 Tackaberry's respon se was to advise 
\X1eber tIlat in future Weber should inform th e guards if he was 'insulted or 
molested', and Tackaberry would 'punish tIle offenders' ,75 This is curious, 
considering tIut Tackaberry gave no commensurate assurance to the Je'\vish 
leaders that he would punish \X1eber or tIle German intemees should they 
breach camp rules again. Instead, Tackaberry advised the Jewish compound 
leaders tIut Jewish internees should not react to the singing of National 
Socialist songs, saying 'all [youl need do is not listen',76 
Koch pointed out tIut the situation in 0 Compound was 
extraordinarily tense, arguing that he 'could not guarantee peace inside this 
compound any longer ... Under these circumstances, you can't expect me to 
bear any responsibility'. 77 Tackaberry advised him that he had to keep 
control, without providing any advice on how Koch was to do so. 
requested six copies o f UlIsrr LiedniJ{(ch for the 'Comradeship Orchestra' in the German Camp: Letter, 
Samuel Hoffmann, Alhrecht Aherle to German Red Cross, 24 .".ugust 1942, in TSAA, i\ lelhourne. 
69 Letters, R. Koch, D Compound leader Oews), to Official Visitors, 3 October 1941; \'iI. \X'eber to Swiss 
Consul, ., Octoher 194 1, NAA 255/715/ 292-i\ IP508/1, i\ lclhourne. It is possible that this 'palaver' is 
\\,'hat SproaT refers to as the unwillingness of the Jewish internees to rerurn to their huts: Report, 
DiSTUrbance '0' Com pound, i\ lajor J . SproaT, 29 September 1941 , NAA 36/101/ 45-J'lIP70/ 1, i\ lclbourne. 
70 Confidential Report , Disturhance in '0' Compound (No. 3 Camp), Lieutenant-Colonel \X'.T. 
Tackaherry, 29 Septemher 1941, NA.A 36/ 101 / 45-,\11'70/1, i\ lclhoume (my emphasis). 
71 'l1lOse present were Koch, 0 Compound leader Oews), Berlowitz, D Compound deputy leader Oews), 
Reginato, D Compound \cader (I talians) and Weber: Letter, R. Koch to Official Visi tors, 3 October 1941, 
NAA 255/ 715j?92- i\IP508/ 1, i\ lelbourne. 
72 TIle \'ery faCT that Tackaberry allocated blame for the disturbance on the Jewish internees is illustrative 
of this perception: Confidential Report , Disturhance in 'D' Compound (No.3 Camp), Lieutenant-Colonel 
w:r. Tackaberry, 29 September 1941 , NA.". 36/ 101 / 45-i\I P70/ 1, 1\lelhourne. 
73 Letter, W. Weber to Swiss Consul, 2 Octoher 1941 , NAA 255 /715/ 292- i\ IP508/ 1, t- Ielhourne. 
74 Ibid. Reginato told a similar story: Letter, Regi.nato, D Compound leader (Italians), to Official Visitors, 
4.0ctober 194 1. NA ... A 255/715/ "92- i\ IP508/ 1, i\ lelbourne. 
7::1 Lener. W. Weber to Swiss Consul, 2 October 1941, NA_r\. 255/715j?92- i\IP508/l, i\ lelhourne. Koch 
noted that Sproat had given him similar advice on the dar hefore: Letter, R. Koch D Compound leader 
Oews), to Official Visitors, 3 Octoher 1941 , NA.". 255/715/ 292- ,\1 1'508/ 1, i\lelhoume. By this stage, of 
!.:purse, Weher had been insulted, hut not assaulted. 
-16 Letter, R. Koch 0 Compound leader Oews), to Official VisiTors, 3 October 1941 , NAA 255/7 15/292-
i\IP508/ t , i\ lelbourne. 
77 Letter, R. Koch D Compound leader Oews), to Official \ ' isiTors, 3 October 1941 , NAA 255/7 15/292-
t- IP508/ 1, t- Ielhourne. 
K OEHNE 
Tackaberry literally saw it as none of his business as the superior officer in 
charge o f Camp 3 Tatura, and left saying '1 have no further sympathy for 
your people'J8 He saw the stated inability o f Koch to maintain contro l as 
an unwillingness to do so. 
The other interesting aspect of the meeting was that 'l'ackaberry 
appears to have supported the Hitler Youth based on ideas o f democracy. 
Wenler Heimann no ted Tackaberry as having expressed the opinion that 'he 
regarded the singing of Nazi-songs and the use of the Hitler salute on part 
,"sic.! of our political an tagonists as absolutely justified as the Empire was 
fighting fo r freedo m of opinion and tl,at tllcrefore he definitely declined of 
taking any steps to preven t N azis o r Fascists of expressing their feeling by 
singing their songs and using tl,eir salutes'J9 T his is also suppo rted by a 
report from Koch: '\'<Ie are , he said, fighting for freedom and for this reason 
the intel11ees o f Compo und "C" must not be preven ted from singing the 
songs they like'.80 
lntriguingly, then, in tl,e name of democracy, tl,e Camp Commandant 
supported tl,e National Socialist Germans over the 'pro-British' Jews.81 It 
seems this was partly based on ideas of race similar to tl,ose expressed in the 
Intelligence Reports, but it was also because Tackaberry did no t wish to 
have to deal with any trouble. His attitude demonstrates an an tipathy to 
those he saw as tro uble makers (the Jewish intemees), which can be seen in 
his unwillingness to enfo rce the camp rules against \Xleber, as well as in his 
jailing of Tilly Heimann. 
1n this regard, a comment of Justice Duffy's is worth analyzing further. 
Remarking on the imprisonment of Tilly H eimann, he stated: 'It is of course 
obvious that if Mrs Heimann was really put into the cells without evidence, 
ocular or o therwise, to justify it, she has a very real cause o f complaint'.82 
Neither Majo r Sproat no r Lieutenant-Colonel Tackaberry had actually 
witnessed T illy Heimann insult "NIrs \Xleber. All internees agreed tha t Mrs 
\'<Ieber simply told ti,e camp commanders that Heimann had insulted her, 
and this was sufficient for Tackaberry to order her locked away: 
A woman passed close to my wife spitting in front o f her and 
using again dirty language ... My wife reported the new incident 
to the Colonel when we came out of ti,e Orderly Room.83 
JT]he Colonel was accosted by lVLrs Webet who accused lVLrs Till)' 
Heimann o f having insulted her. 84 
78 Ibid. To Koch's question of how he could keep order in the present situation, Tackaben:y apparently 
r~lied 'ThaI is your business.' 
7 \V. Ilcimann 10 Official Visitors, 29 September 1941 , NAt\. 255/715/292-1\1P508/ I, !\ Idbourne. 
80 Letter, It Koch, D Compound leader Oews), to Official Visitors, 3 October 1941, N A A 255/715/292-
1\ IP508/ 1,1\lclboume. 
81 Reginalo referred to Ihe Jewish internees disparagingly as 'pro-British': Letter, Reginalo, D Compound 
l e~dcr (Italians), to Official Visitors, 4 October 1941, NA.t\. 255 /715/292-MP508/ 1, /l,lclbourne. 
8_ Report , Official Visitors, 7 October 1941 , NAA 255/7 15/ 292-1\[P508/ t, Melbourne. 
83 Leltcr, \X'. Weber 10 Swiss Consul, 2 October 1941, NA." 255 /7 15 / 292-1\ [1'508/ 1, !\ Iclbourne. 
84 Letter, R. Koch, D Compound leader Oews), to Official Visitors, 3 October 1941 , N AA 255/ 7 15/292-
1\ IP508/ 1,1\ lclbourne. Reginato also confirmed that Tackaberry acted solely on 1\lrs \'(Ieber's complaint: 
Letter, Reginalo, D Compound leader (Italians), to Official Visitors, 4 October 194 1, NAA 255/715/292-
1\11'508/ 1,1\ lclbourne. 
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Tackaberry's action was based in a dcsire to rcgain control of Camp 3, 
and the fact that hc had assurcd \'Valdemar ''(Ieber only moments before tha t 
he would punish anyone who 'in sulted or molested ' \X/cber seems to be his 
mo tiva tion for this swift decision.85 Tackaberry wished to be in control, and 
perceived as being in control. This action, though, was the final straw for 
the J ewish internees, particularly as no actio n had bccn takcn against 
Weber.'" 
\Xleber seems to have been fairly bo mbastic , and in a rcport to thc 
Swiss Consul s tated that when the singing occurred, '1 had to publicly 
con finn my fa ith . 1 raised m y righ t ann and exclaimed repeatedly as loud as 
I could: Heil Hitler!'87 He also portrayed himself as heroic and the Jews as 
cowardly. His versio n o f the attack was that: 'T hree Jews tried to beat me 
with tileir fists whereby, however, they only succeeded in getting bleeding 
noses fro m my counterblows' .88 Purther, after tile firing o f the shots, he 
claimed that the ltalians and Genn ans hc.ld the fidd: 'j cws and j ewesses ran 
screaming fo r their lives, and dispersed very quickly. ''(Ie faccd tile Officer 
o f tile Guard and his men and wcre o rdcred to go to our hut 
co mparnnent'.89 Probably more accurate arc the repo rts that the riot 
involved brief and intense 's treet-battle' fighting, befo re the shots sent 
everyone running for cover.90 
While willing to take control of 0 Co mpound, tilcrc appears to have 
been an unwillingness on tile part of Camp Command to takc rcsponsibility 
for placing N azis and fa scists with the j cwish intcrnecs in thc first placc. 
Paul Bartrop notes tilat tile Bri tish High Commissioncr's O ffice had wri tten 
in D ecember 1940 explaining tila t N azis sho uld not be interned wi til '1\.oti-
N azis', and repo rts in 1941 and 1942 reiteratcd this.91 'fhe Anny had also 
received wanl ings much closcr to hom e. Lcttcrs had been sent to the Camp 
Command by the Jewish Icader for 0 Compound, outlining thc difficulties 
o f being intemed with N azis and fascists, and requcsting (on occasio n, 
demanding) that they be removed from 0 compo und.92 ] t sccms that these 
letters are what Tackabcrry was referring to whcn he co mplaincd that the 
'Camp has been o f grcat difficul ty'.93 
85 Letter, W. \'.;'eber to Swiss Consul, 2 October 1941, NAA 255/715/ 292, series ;\IP508/ 1. 
86 Weber was only sent to Camp I after having been aWlCked by the Jewish internees, :md went 'with a 
small cut on his head': Report, Disturbance 'D' Compound, ~Iajor J. Sproat, 29 September 1941 , NA.A 
36/ 101/45-,\11'70/ 1, ~ Ielbourne. [n fact, on 28 September, ~Iajor Sproat had declined to rcmovc \'<'eber 
from D Compound, arg\ling there needed to be an im'estigation before such an action: leiter, It Koch, D 
Cfmpound leader Oews), to Offici:11 Visitors, 3 October 194 1, NAA 255/7 1 5/292-~ I P508/ I, ~ Iclbourne. 
8 utter, W. Weber to Swiss Consul, 2 October 1941. NAA 255/715/ 292-;\11'508/ I. ~ Iclbourne. 
88 Ibid. The three men were laTer idenTified as Beer, LiebrechT and Brarspies, but The man who tried 10 
climb into D Compound was not identified: Report, Disturbance 'D' Compound, ~ I ator J. Sproat, 29 
w,tember 1941 . NAA 36/ 101/45-;\IP70/ I, ~ Ielboume. 
8 Letter, W. Weber to Swiss Consul, 2 October 1941, NAA 255/715/292-;\IP508/ I, ~Ielboume. 
90 utters, R. Koch, D Compound leader Oe\\15), to Official VisiTOrs, 3 OcTober 1941; and Reginato, D 
Compound leader (Italians). to Official Visitors. 4 OCTober 1941 , NA_" 255/715/292-;\11'508/ 1, 
~1c1bourne. 
Bartrop, 'Enemy Alien Imernees', 162. He nOles that the report \\'as issued on 17 December 1940. See 
also i\linute Paper, lIome Office Liaison Officer, 19 December 1941 , N!\!\ 255/7 15/292-;\IP508/ 1, 
~;elbourne; and ReporT, Official Visitors, 6 OctOber 1942, NA!\ 255/7 [5/680-MI'508/ I, ~ [clbournc . 
- LetTers, G. Seefeld, D Compound leader Oew5), to Offiei:ll Visitors, 5 November 1940, 17 June 1941 , 
27 J une 1941, NAA 255/715/292-i\ IPS08/ I, i\lelbourne. 
93 In another ann}' reporT, leTTers of complaint were referred to as a 'fonn of subtle saboTage': IRT, II 
October 1942, NAA 37/ 101 / 185-J'o,IP70/ 1. 
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1\t the meeting on 29 September the Jewish leaders had rcquested that 
the ltalians and Germans be moved out of 0 Compound, but were 
rcfused.94 T'he ] talians and Gennans intemcd in 0 Compound also 
requested that they be shifted into either other compounds or that the jews 
be moved into another camp, but wcre also refused. 95 'T'ackaberry's 
comment to thc Gennans and Italians in 0 was that cllCy had to remain 
where they wcrc, and clle anny 'would protect [themJ from 
encroachments',96 The anny officers in charge appear to have viewed it as 
none of clleir concern tha t both parties involved in clle riot wished to be 
separated from each other, whilst also expecting cllem to maintain a 
cohesion and lcvel of order in that Compound. Tackaberry emphasized this 
last point to the 0 Compound leaders,97 His sympathics, though, lay with 
the co-opera tive and ordered German intemees, However, as a result of the 
milita ry review, and of complaints to the Swiss Consul , twenty-seven 
Gernlans werc moved out of 0 Compound, and orders wcrc issued to 
remove aU Nazis and fascists, leaving 'j ewish intemees exclusivcly',98 
Conclusion: A Fractured View 
The Australian Anny Camp Command was aware of the politics of in ternees, 
but as long as order existed, they were unconcerned about thesc politics, or 
dle ways in which they were manifested. Even reports which specifically 
noted brcaches of camp rules were ignored,99 The Camp Command viewed 
internees benevolcntly so long as dley were controllcd. However, dle 
military commandcrs in charge of the camps also appear to have held 
prejudiccs that influenced their views of which groups of internees were 
orderly, and applicd rules accordingly. The riot in Camp 3 is an example of 
just such an occasion, Caused in the first lllsrance by a breach of camp rules 
- Hitler Youth marching in formation singing National Socialist songs - and 
in the second instance by a further breach of camp rules by \X'aldemar 
94 Rcporrcd in LCllcrs. \'II, Hcimann to Official Visitors, 79 September 1941; It Koch, D Compound 
le,ilder Oews), to O fficial Visitors, 3 OctOber 1941 , NAA 255/7 15/ 292-l\ IP508/ I, l\lclboume, 
9:) Reported in LcTters, \Y..'. \'('eber to Swiss Consul, 2 October 1941; Reginato, 0 Compound leader 
(Italians), to Official Visitors, 7 OctOber 1941 and 4 October 1941 ; various Gcrman-Australian intcrnees, 
D Compound, 10 Official Visitors, 2 October 1941 , NAA 255/715/ 292-:'.!P508/ I, i\ lclbourne. 
96 W. \'('cbcr 10 Swiss Consul, 2 October 194 1, NA.-'. 755/7 15/ 292-;\ 11'508/ I, l\ lclboumc. 
97 Reporled in LeHcrs, R. Koch, D Compound leader Oews), to Official Visitors. 3 October 194 1; 
Reginato, 0 Compound leader (Italians), to Official Visitors, 4 October 194 1; NAA 255/ 715/ 292-
;\ IP508/ 1, i\ Jclbournc, 
98 Aft er the riot, thi rtecn internees wrOte 10 the Consul advising they must bc mo ved 'on account o f there 
being a majority o f Jewish intcrnees with whom ... it would be wlbearnblc TO lil'c Together for any 
prolongcd period': L.cHcr, Swiss Consul to " ' ajor T.K. Maltby, 30 September 1941 , NAA 36/ 10 1/ 45--
" '1'70/ 1. i\ lclbourne. Curiously, the letter initially had fo urteen intcrnccs listcd, including Waldemar 
Weber, and was scnt on 26 September, twO days before the incidents in Camp 3. These intcrnees 
rciterated thcir rcquest (witho ut Waldemar) to the O fficial Visi tors on 2 October: Letter, various German-
• .-\ustralian intcrnccs, 0 Compo und, to Official Visitors, 2 October 1941 , Nf\A 255/7 15/ 292-i\ IP508/ 1, 
i\ lclbournc. I nc GOC recorded in his reporr to the i\ lililary Board that ordcrs would be givcn to rcmOI'c 
' the incomplclc clcmcnts' of D Compowld into Compounds A- C: Con fidcntial Note, GOC, Southern 
Command, No, 3 Camp Tatura Disorders, 7 O<:tober 1941, Nl"L.-\ 36/ tO t / 45--i\ [P70/ 1, i\Jelbourne. All o f 
the twenty-scven ' local Germrtns' moved 10 A- C o n 3 October 1941, scc Letter, Albrecht Aberle to Swiss 
Consul, 13 NOI'cmber 1941 , TSk-'. (i\ lelbourne). Compound 0 still seems to have kid Jewish, Italian and 
German internccs in 1942: Lettcr, Samuel Ho ffmann to SI\r1SS Consul, 26 November 1942, TSA.A, 
i\ lclbournc. 
99 As was Ihe case wilh an Intelligence Reporr that noted 'youth havc becn obsen'ed carrying out 
man;:hing mm'cments of a military nature while the girls quitc openly indulge in Ihc "1'lei! Hiller" salute.' 
Sec I RT, 26 Dc<:cmber 1942, NAA 37/ 10 1/ 18i-,\ IP 70/ 1, " Ielbourne, 
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Weber shouting Nazi slogans and giving the Hider salute, the blame for the 
ensuing riot was placed on the Jewish in ternees, who were seen by both 
'T'ackaberry and Sproa t as disorderly, by contrast to the 'order loving 
Gennans'.IOO 
Thus, the riot in the camp can be partly traced to a bias based on 
etl1l1icity, but mostly to the concern of the Camp Command to maintain 
ordcr. Unfo rtunately, the Camp Command took sides, based in part on ideas 
of which internees were able to remain orderly. As emphasised in their 
reports, Sproat and 'T'ackaberry viewed the Genn an internees as 'help ful', 
efficient, co-operative, and willing to help maintain order. By contrast, the 
Jcwish in tcm ees were described as excitable, un-cooperative, and 
clisorded y.IOI These same Jewish internees were avowedly an ti-Nazi and 
p ro-British. As such , they believed they had been unjustly in terned and 
complained, particularly because tlley were in terned with Nazis o r fascis ts. 
At tllC operatio nal level, the anny appeared to be relatively unco ncemed 
with the justice o r injustice o f in ternment, or whether til ere werc breaches 
of camp rules by in tem ees, so long as they remained disciplined . 
However, the Board of Inquiry indicates that the Camp Command 
po licy cannot necessarily be ascribed to the i\ustralian i\ ony High 
Command. Altho ugh not acrually punishing the officers in charge of the 
camps fo r tlleir actions, the Board indicated that the camp sho uld have been 
run strictly in acco rdance with stated camp rules. T he review makes it clear 
that a gap cxisted between the views of the officers in charge of the camp, 
and tllOSC o f their superiors. Further, the vario us letters and reports from 
intemccs themselvcs demonstrate that the information given by the Camp 3 
officcrs to tllC Board was skewed to fit the anticipated views of tlleir 
supcriors. This, in tum, o ffers us the insight that the camp o fficers were 
aware tha t they were not operating strictly in accordance wi til the wishes of 
tlleir slIpeLiors. It appears, though, that at the operational level, it was far 
simpler to allow internees to control their own activities, rathet than anempt 
to tun the camps tluough military means. Unforrunately, o n this occasion 
such a policy meant tllat what began wi til words ended with sticks and 
stones. 
U Jlillcrsi(y if ft.1.c/bol/rtJc 
100 lbough Tackaberry was very unsympathetic towards the Jewish internees, he did laTer show some 
appreciation for their plight. As recorded in Pearl, he wrote a letter to the magazine M,!(ti in 1945, arguing 
that most of the internees were 'Refugee Aliens' rather than 'Enemy Aliens', and should nOt be viewed as 
'suspect' if released into Australia: Cyril Pearl, TI)( DIll/em Scandal (London: l\ngus & Roberston, 1983), 
208-9. By this stllgc, he had already relinguished his command. 
101 RepOrT, Disturbance 'D' Compound, i\lajor J. SproaT, 29 September 194 1; and Confidential Repon, 
DiSTurbance in 'D' Compound (No.3 Camp), Lieutenant-Colonel W.T. Tackaberry, 29 September 1941 , 
NAl\ 36/ 10 1/ 45--i\IP70/ 1, Melbourne. 
